Die baltischen Staaten (Estland, Litauen, Lettland) sowie Bulgarien und Rumänien bezahlen für die Sünden des Kasino-Kapitalismus. Denn ihre wirtschaftliche Entwicklung basierte auf einer Integration in das EU-Bankensystem, das in der optimistischen Unverantwortlichkeit voll auf die EU-Integration setzte und Kreditmilliarden in die Wirtschaft pumpte.
Das zeigt eine Analyse, die die unterschiedliche Performanz von Staaten wie Polen und Tschechien, denen einigermaßen eine gewisse Reindustrialisierung gelang, mit denen des Baltikums oder von Bulgarien und Rumänien zeigt.
"What factors have contributed to these diverging developments? The speed of credit growth seems to correlate well with unsustainable developments and hence the key question is what are the underlying causes of fast credit growth, particularly in the BB5 and WB6 countries? Certainly the fixed exchange rate in many countries was a contributing factor, since price-level convergence could occur only through higher inflation (as opposed to nominal exchange-rate appreciation). However, other domestic policies, such as fiscal policy or banking regulation, did not play a significant role. Instead, deep integration with the EU has predisposed CESEE countries to large capital inflows. It is fair to conclude, not just with the benefit of hindsight, that the lending practices of mostly foreign-owned banks were not always prudent.
When the crisis started, it first hit western banks forcing them to accumulate liquidity to cover losses from non-performing assets, and to build up reserves. This led to sudden interruptions, and even reversals, of bank-linked parts of capital inflows to the emerging markets, including most of the CESEE region. This was accompanied by outflow of other categories of capital as other financial investors became more riskaverse and decided to reduce their exposure in CESEE countries and fly to 'safe havens'. The resulting credit crunch was strong enough to depress economic activity and pitch most CESEE economies into recession. The impact was exacerbated by the subsequent export and investment declines, the latter resulting from increased overall uncertainty about future growth prospects. As the crisis unfolded, the credit crunch was replaced by falling demand for credit, caused by increased uncertainty and lowered expectations with respect to future growth prospects (Ghosh, 2009)."
Whither growth in central and eastern Europe? Policy lessons for an integrated Europe.
BY TORBJÖRN BECKER, DANIEL DAIANU, ZSOLT DARVAS, VLADIMIR GLIGOROV, MICHAEL LANDESMANN, PAVLE PETROVIC, JEAN PISANI-FERRY, DARIUSZ ROSATI, ANDRÉ SAPIR AND BEATRICE WEDER DI MAURO.
BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT SERIES, Volume XI. www.bruegel.org. ISBN: 978-9-078910-17-6.